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Abstract  
 This thesis seeks to understand how the Affordable Care Act impacted certain groups 
who had faced barriers to accessing health insurance prior to the passage of the act. It provides a 
fundamental understanding of the major provisions of the Affordable Care Act and discusses dis-
parities amongst, and challenges incurred, by different groups in the current health insurance sys-
tem,  Research focused specifically on demographic factors of income, gender, primary language 
spoken, ethnicity, education and age as Ill as looked at the effect that urban setting and sufficient 
internet access had on enrollment rates. In order to understand the impact that the Affordable 
Care Act has had on different demographic’s ability to obtain insurance, I compared the number 
of estimated eligible enrollees to the number of those who actually enrolled in the federal mar-
ketplace exchanges in the year of 2014.  
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Section 1. Introduction  
  One major goal of the Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act was to move the Unit-
ed States towards universal healthcare coverage by increasing access for many Americans who 
previously did not have health insurance. Prior to the ACA, a person had three major ways to re-
ceive health insurance: through an employer group insurance, through a non-group option or if a 
person met the qualification requirements, they could receive insurance through governmental 
social programs.  The lower socioeconomic classes were eligible to receive Medicaid or other 
social insurance such as Children’s Health Insurance Program. (CHIP). The elderly, who have 
the highest medical needs, received health insurance through Medicare. However, the majority of 
Americans received health insurance through their place of employment.  If a person did not 
have health insurance offered through their employer, they could seek out non-group insurance 
on their own. However, not everyone was eligible to receive non-group insurance. Non-group 
policies required that a person prove they were healthy enough to be a good candidate for the 
insurance company to insure. Many people were denied non-group health insurance because they 
had risky health conditions or lifestyles. Yet even for many who were offered an insurance poli-
cy, the non-group policies charged very high costs which often made non-group insurance too 
expensive to afford.  
 These people fell into what was called the “gap group” who were not eligible to receive 
any health insurance coverage making them the primary group the government sought to expand 
coverage to. Thus the ACA created a form of governmental health insurance ran through market-
place exchange websites, that guaranteed coverage to anyone who did not have employer insur-
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ance offered, did not qualify for other forms of social insurance, or had insurance coverage that 
did not meet new affordability and coverage standards as newly defined by the ACA. 
 The following sections of this thesis discuss in greater detail how Affordable Care Act 
sought to address several of the factors that attributed to a person’s inability to obtain health in-
surance and will analyze what impact the act had on providing insurance to different demograph-
ic groups. Section 2 of this thesis provides a brief history of the passage of the Affordable Care 
Act and discusses some of the controversies associated with the legislation. Next, Section 3 pro-
vides a fundamental understanding of the major provisions of the act and gives an overview of 
some of the major challenges that the healthcare system was facing prior to the passage of the 
act. Particularly important for our analysis throughout the paper, is the discussion on the estab-
lishment of marketplaces.  
 Next, Section 4. discusses the challenges that impeded certain group’s ability to access 
health insurance and the healthcare system overall. It specifically focuses on the challenges 
based on different income levels, gender, primary language spoken, ethnicity, education and age. 
I also looked at challenges faced by those in urban settings and challenges faced by those without 
sufficient internet access. This section provides the basic understanding for my hypotheses which 
are laid out in section 5. 
 The data analysis helped me determine if whether marketplace enrollment levels showed 
increased coverage for groups who had historically faced disparities in coverage or if certain 
groups were still more likely see lower enrollment rates after the ACA. I was able to determine 
the impact that the Affordable Care Act has had on different group’s ability to obtain insurance 
by comparing the number of people across different demographic subgroupings who were eligi-
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ble to enroll with the number who actually enrolled in the marketplace exchanges. The results 
will be discussed in more detail throughout sections 6 and section 7.  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   Section 2. Passage of the Affordable Care Act 
 For over a century the issue of governmental health care has been a heavily debated topic. 
Many bills were proposed and many bills failed. Finally in 2010, through a series of compromis-
es, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) finally passed through Congress and 
was signed into law (Rigby). The ACA faced controversy from the beginning over funding, is-
sues of federal compulsion versus state’s rights, and many details of the actual policy substance. 
That controversy was augmented by the belief that the bill very partisan. The Democratic Party 
held such a majority that they were able to push the bill through both chambers of Congress 
without needing a single vote from the Republican minority party.The bill was then signed into 
law by a Democratic president. Upon judicial challenging, the act’s constitutionally was upheld 
the Supreme Court by only one vote which was cast by the traditionally conservatively leaning 
Chef Justice, John Roberts. Robert’s vote amongst the liberal court members was seen by some 
as a vote aimed not at upholding the laws but rather as a vote aimed at ensuring a positive lasting 
legacy for the Robert’s Court.  The bill’s passage and continuous institutional upholding has 
largely been attributed to an auspicious political opportunity structure that the Democratic Par-
ty’s strength at the time provided (Rigby).  
 The heated political rhetoric around the bill often overshadowed the intent and actual 
content of the law, leading to more misunderstanding amongst Americans as to how the ACA 
will affect everyone’s access to healthcare and affordable treatment. The ACA’s primary intent 
was to move the United States towards universal coverage, while containing costs and improving 
patient protection and overall quality of care. The byproduct of the numerous series of debates 
and compromises yielded over 20,000 pages of legislation and addresses too many specific de-
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tails to discuss thoroughly within the limits of this thesis so, in order to gain an adequate under-
standing of the act, the following section discusses seven major pieces of the legislation: the 
mandate of essential standards on insurance companies, the mandate of individuals to acquire 
coverage, the mandate of employers to provide essential coverage, Medicare expansion, Med-
icaid reform and expansion, and the establishment of online insurance marketplace exchanges. 
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   Section 3. Understanding the Affordable Care Act 
 The ACA set forth a mandate that required insurance companies to provide essential 
standards of care aimed at expanding access to a larger pool of patients. The first major provision 
mandated that a young adult could remain on his or her parent’s insurance plan until his or her 
twenty-sixth (26) birthday, as long as he or she did not have health insurance coverage offered 
through his or her own employer. The provision’s primary goal was to expand the number of 
young adults with insurance coverage, while the secondary goal was also to allow that age group 
more flexibility in choosing a career path, continuing their education or finding a job opening, 
without losing his or her coverage. The provision went into effect in 2010 and by 2012, nearly 
eight million young adults between ages nineteen and twenty-six were able to stay on their par-
ent’s insurance plans (Dahlen).  
 Additionally restrictions were imposed upon an insurance company’s ability to make ar-
bitrary cancelations of policyholder’s coverage. In the past, if a policyholder were to make an 
error on the insurance application or if they left out non-important information regarding their 
health, the insurance company had more power to cancel the plan or declare the insurance cover-
age contract invalid since the date it was originally signed. In some instances, an insurer could 
possibly require the person pay back the benefits collected under the invalidated plan. While 
sometimes this was used as fraud control, this practice was sometimes used as a way to drop pol-
icyholders that become too costly. Now under the ACA, if patients make a deigned “honest” mis-
take on their insurance forms, or if they leave out “non-critical” information that was not intend-
ed to defraud, the insurance company can no longer legally make arbitrary policy cancelations 
(HHS Curving Insurance Cancellations).  
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 The final provision of the essential standards mandate stated that insurance companies are 
no longer allowed to charge people a higher rate for having a preexisting condition. Preexisting 
conditions encompass any illness the person had before they had obtained insurance coverage 
through that insurer. In addition to discriminating based on just preexisting health status, some 
insurance companies treated sex similarly to having a preexisting health condition. Women were 
charged higher rates since they would likely undergo childbirth and accrue more medical costs 
overtime than a man likely would. Under the ACA, an insurance company was prohibited from 
charging a person higher premiums based on either health status or sex. Additionally, the insurer 
may not deny coverage or treatments based on any preexisting condition (HHS. Pre-existing 
Conditions). 
 However, by eliminating higher rates for people with preexisting conditions, the financial 
burden was shifted from the consumer to the insurance companies. Previously, the higher rates 
were placed upon people with certain preexisting conditions since they would more likely re-
quire repetitive, advanced treatments that would go beyond the scope of normal coverage thus 
accruing higher costs for the company and the individual. By charging higher rates for high risks 
people, the insurance companies were able to maintain lower premiums for normal to lower risk 
people in the market (Haeder, High Risk Pools).   
 In order to maintain an overall lower insurance market rate, the federal government 
passed the Trade Act of 2002 and subsequent legislation to address health care insurance costs by 
providing subsidies in the form of tax credits to qualifying people with higher medical needs. 
Essentially, people with more costly medical needs are placed in a high-risk category and are eli-
gible to receive subsidized medical coverage. By 2012, thirty-five states had accepted federal 
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funding to help create high-risk insurance pools. However, the quality and scope of these pro-
grams varied by state and often still had higher premiums that many people could not afford. 
Moreover, these programs often required extensive qualifications that greatly limited access, had 
long wait list periods, had life-time caps on how much aid a person could receive, and usually 
covered about half the cost of treatment. Despite the strides made to reduce barriers to access, 
coverage still remains unaffordable for many high risk patients  (Haeder,You Can’t Make Me Do 
It).  
 In addition to the subsidies provided to form separate high-risk insurance pools, insur-
ance companies are also projected to recover costs through the individual mandate provision. 
The individual mandate requires every US citizen to either obtain insurance or pay a fine for not 
obtaining insurance coverage. This will increase the overall number of people in the insurance 
pool which would bring in more premiums for the insurance company as well as change the de-
mographics of the pool. Previously, the market demographic had a selection bias where it con-
sisted of more people with high health risks who needed to purchase and use medical insurance, 
while the healthy, low-risk people did not buy insurance or would sign up for minimalistic plans. 
Under the individual mandate, healthy low-risk individuals will now become part of the pool, 
thus increasing the revenue an insurance company takes in while likely costing the insurance 
companies less which helps to control for overall costs.  Additionally, the extension of time al-
lowed for adolescents to remain on their parent’s insurance plans helps to increase the number of 
young adults in the pool. More adolescents in the pool further balances costs since this younger 
age group is likely to be at a lower health risk than older insureds.  (Haeder High Risk Pools). 
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 In addition to the mandates, the Affordable Care Act established online marketplace ex-
changes. Marketplaces target the “gap group” who are people who earn too much to qualify for 
Medicaid but still fall below the federal poverty line and do not have employee based insurance 
or have employee based insurance that is not compliant with the ACA’s affordability and adequa-
cy provisions.  This group perviously was at a higher risk of being uninsured and did not have 
assistance to make insurance more affordable. Now people whose income falls within 400% of 
the federal poverty line are eligible for premium tax credits which is essentially money given to 
reduce the financial burden of purchasing health insurance and may only be used on the ex-
changes. The amount of credit given varies depending on factors such as income and cost of in-
surance relative to their geographic area. The insured pays a percentage of their income rating 
from 2% of income at the federal poverty line up to 9% of their income as they move further 
away from the federal poverty line with premium tax credits covering the difference (Kaiser, 
State by State Estaminets).  
 The actual marketplaces are websites that bring together all the different insurance cover-
age options to allow qualifying buyers to be able to compare different plans and have more in-
formation and more options available. Marketplaces are intended not only to increase the number 
of purchasers but also help increase competition between insurance companies and help increase 
transparency and the ability of the government to regulate and enforce laws. In addition to pro-
viding options and plans, the marketplaces were also given the task of determining eligibility for 
enrollment as well as what subsidies were available for each costumer (Haeder High Risk Pools). 
States were given the option either to develop their own exchange which would entail creating a 
website or working through the federal website to oversee enrollment, determine eligibility and 
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subsidies, and enforce the ACA provisions. If a state did not choose to develop their own ex-
change by January 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services would automatically 
add the state into the federally facilitated exchange (Haeder High Risk Pools).   
  States were given great leeway in deciding how to run and implement their exchange as 
well as in setting tailored provisions that would better fit the needs of their state. Therefore there 
are several variances across states and exchange types. For example, Mississippi, Arkansas and 
Utah created marketplaces to help small business owners gain health insurance but did not create 
a state ran exchange for individual enrollment. The two most common choices were either creat-
ing a state based exchange or relying on the federal exchange. State based exchanges can be fur-
ther broken down into entirely state based exchanges or federally supported state based ex-
changes. The federal marketplace can be further divided into state partnership federal exchanges 
and federally facilitated exchanges. Both state based marketplaces and federally supported mar-
ketplaces independently run their own marketplace in terms of operations, regulations and over-
sight and preform all the essential features of the marketplace. However in state based market-
places, the state created its own website for enrollment whereas in federally supported market-
places, states use the federally created and operated website, healthcare.gov, for enrollment in-
stead. In state partnership exchanges and state facilitated exchanges, the state did not create its 
own exchange and relies on the federal marketplace. However in state partnership exchanges the 
state does offer in person help services while in federally supported exchanges the entirety of 
support services falls on the federal government (Kaiser State Health Insurance Marketplace 
Types). 
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 The next major provision under the ACA was to aid in expanding existing Medicaid pro-
grams. States were allotted more funding to expand their existing Medicaid programs in order for 
those programs to become more inclusive. Before the ACA, Medicaid was a federal program that 
aided persons under sixty-five years of age that fall within 138% of the federal poverty line and 
were either a person with disability, parents that met certain need based criteria, impoverished 
children, or pregnant women. Now under the new law, in states that expand the program, other 
adults that fall within the 138% of the federal poverty line are also eligible for benefits (Wachino 
et al). 









California Hawaii Arkansas Alabama Nebraska 
Colorado Nevada Deleware Alaska New Jersey 
Connecticut New Mexico Illinois Arizona North Carolina 
D.C Oregon Iowa Florida North Dakota 
Idaho Michigan Georgia Ohio 
Kentucky New Hampshire Indiana  Oklahoma
Maryland West Virginia Kansas Pennsylvania 
Massachusetts Louisiana South Carolina 
Minnesota Maine South Dakota 
New York Mississippi Tennessee 
Rhode Island Missouri Texas
Vermont Montana Utah 
Washington Virginia 
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  While Medicaid expansion is optional for states, other Medicaid enrollment changes are 
not. Regardless of whether a state chooses to expand, the ACA requires that new standards de-
signed to simplify enrollment must be implemented. States are required to offer applications 
through multiple sources such as by phone, online, in person or via mail, in an attempt to in-
crease access and to reduce the amount of time that an applicant has to wait in order to receive 
his or her benefits. The new law also increases enrollment outreach aimed to help educate and 
encourage eligible people to apply for benefits. Initially outreach occurred as a combined effort 
for marketplace enrollment but has continued to operate year round. Since the start of the expan-
sion period in October 2013 through March 2014, 4.8 million more individuals enrolled in Med-
icaid (Wachino et al). 
 Similar to the expansion of the Medicaid program, the ACA sought to close coverage 
gaps in Medicare programs and sought to increase the longevity of the programs by containing 
costs. The Department of Health and Human Services along with the Department of Justice have 
increased coordination amongst themselves and the states in order to help detect, prevent, and 
eliminate fraud and waste, which is expected to save billions a year. These savings helped to ex-
pand Mediciad until 2024 instead of allowing parts of the program to expire in 2016 as originally 
projected would occur due to a lack of funding. Low funds also aided in the creation of what is 
commonly referred to as the “Medicare Donut hole”, which is a coverage gap that affected about 
three million Medicare recipients. While within that gap, recipients must pay for medicine at full 
cost with little to no insurance coverage or subsidies. This gap often resulted in a patient’s inabil-
ity to purchase medicine or resulted in irregular dosage usage depending on when a patient could 
afford the drug. However under ACA, the gap is set to phase out by 2020 leaving patients to only 
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pay the Medicaid 20% standard copay of the out of pocket cost. Lastly, the program now will 
cover more preventative care such as yearly wellness exams, mammograms, colonoscopies, and 
other screenings without charging the recipient deductibles and copays. (medicare-rights.org).  
 The last portion of the ACA I will discuss is the employer mandate. Employers are re-
quired to offer health insurance that is considered both affordable and adequate, only if that em-
ployer has fifty or more full time equivalent employees. Full time equivalent employers are those 
who work an average of at least thirty hours a week per month. In order for insurance to be con-
sidered affordable, the cost of the insurance plan cannot cost more than 9.5% of the employee’s 
household income. Additionally, the plan must cover 60% of a patient’s medical costs to meet the 
minimum standards requirement for adequate coverage (Chamber of Commerce- Employer 
Mandate). If the employer does not offer insurance at all or does not offer insurance that meets 
the affordable and minimum adequacy standards, then they are subject to fines. These fines vary 
based on several factors such as if the employees offers insurance at all or varies by the number 
of employees within the company. The idea of the fine is both to encourage employees to offer 
affordable, quality plans but it is also to prevent employers from benefiting by shifting the cost 
of insurance from themselves to the federal government via tax credits. Low income employees 
that fall within 100% to 400% of the federal poverty line, that cannot get affordable and adequate 
coverage through an employer, are eligible for a federal tax credit to purchase insurance through 
the marketplace exchanges (Chamber of Commerce- Employer Mandate). 
 Numerous lawsuits arose potentially threatening the survival of the ACA. While a few of 
the mandates did not pass judicial review, a strong majority of the provisions were upheld. One 
of the major challenges arose over the individual mandate. Congressional Democrats, who single 
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handedly passed the bill through both houses, viewed the Affordable Care Act the same as any 
other bill written to address the general public health and welfare concerns while Republicans 
viewed the individual mandate as a gross overreach of power that impeded liberty and invaded 
privacy. Democrats asserted that the individual mandate was constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause, which gives the government the power to regulate interstate commerce. However, Re-
publicans generally argued that mandating citizens to purchase insurance took government regu-
lation too far by not just regulating commerce but requiring commerce and punishing those who 
did not engage in insurance commerce (Denniston). 
 The individual mandate’s constitutionality as well as potentially repealing the ACA be-
came a hot button topic and received great media attention during he 2012 campaign season. The 
Supreme Court, in a controversial decision, upheld that since the commerce clause of the consti-
tution granted the government taxation privileges, the mandate could require every citizen to 
have insurance or levy a tax as a penalty for not having health insurance (Howe).  
 One important provision that the Supreme Court struck down was the mandate that states 
must expand their current Medicaid system or would have their federal funding withheld for their 
existing Medicaid programs.The Supreme Court ruled that since the federal government provid-
ed such substantial funding for Medicaid for such a long period, states have become dependent 
on the federal funding. Henceforth, that dependency hinders a state’s ability to choose to refuse 
to expand to such a point that the state does not have a choice. The Supreme Court ruled that this 
part of the Act infringed upon state’s rights. So additional funding was still available to states 
that wanted to expand their Medicaid programs but the ruling prohibited the withholding of 
funds for Medicaid programs already in place in states that did not wish to expand (Howe).  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    Section 4. Barriers to Access  
 The ACA essentially guarantees that any citizen who does not have employer based in-
surance or is eligible to receive other types of government insurance like Medicaid, can gain in-
surance through the marketplace. So while every citizen theoretically has access to a form of 
health insurance, there may exist challenges for certain groups to actually utilize health insur-
ance. The following section looks at both historic trends that have long existed amongst those 
who have insurance and those who do not. The section also posits that the marketplaces and the 
healthcare industry as a whole are facing challenges as our country technologically, culturally, 
and demographically changes.  
 Socioeconomic status is arguably the primary factor that affects a person’s access to in-
surance. Inability to afford insurance is reported as the number one reason as to why a person is 
uninsured. Many factors contribute to limited access amongst lower socioeconomic groups in-
cluding not only having lower paying jobs, but also an increased likelihood to have fewer em-
ployer offered insurance benefits, an increased chance of having less stable work, and the inabili-
ty to afford premiums even with assistance provided through the governmental subsidies (“Key 
Facts of Uninsured Populations”). 
 Since the passage of the ACA, the rate of the uninsured has dropped significantly espe-
cially amongst women and minorities.  As of March 2015, the Department of Health and Human 
Services reported that 16.2 million Americans had gained insurance since 2010 when the ACA 
was passed. The majority of the newly insured come from marketplace enrollment, expansion of 
Medicaid, and the provision allowing children to remain on parent’s insurance until age 26.  Mi-
nority insurance rates, which had historically tended to be much lower, increased significantly. 
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The rate of those without insurance dropped by nearly 10% for African Americans and dropped 
by nearly 12.3% for Latin Americans (ACA is Working”).  Roughly, 7.7 million women gained 
insurance coverage and roughly 55 million women are expectedly benefitting from the ACA’s 
required expansion of preventive care coverage (“ACA is Working”).    
 In 2014, one in every eight women did not have health insurance. Overall, for all women 
the most commonly reported reason to not have health insurance was that they could not afford 
it. One factor that contributed was that thirty four percent of women gained health insurance 
through their own workplace compared to forty-three percent of men who obtained health insur-
ance coverage through their workplace ("Women’s Health Insurance Coverage.) Not having em-
ployer based coverage offered is significant because when employer based coverage is not of-
fered, the two common options for gaining insurance are either government social insurance pro-
grams or non-group coverage. Non-group coverage is generally much more expensive because 
the insured has to provide proof of insurability which can require doctors exams in order for the 
insurers to determine if they want to offer insurance and how to price a policy whereas with em-
ployer insurance, the employee automatically qualifies and usually has cheaper rates based off 
the entire pool. Since prior to the ACA women were charged more already, non-group insurance 
was particularly expensive. 
 Additionally, since women were less likely to have employer based coverage, they were 
also more likely than men to gain insurance as a dependent of their spouse with twenty four per-
cent of women listed as dependents versus sixteen percent of men ("Women’s Health 
Insurance Coverage). This left women with a greater risk of losing insurance coverage if they 
were to become widowed or divorced. Single mothers, whether divorced, widowed, or never 
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married, had the highest risk of being uninsured. Single mothers had a twenty percent higher rate 
than two parent households of being uninsured (“Women’s Health Insurance Coverage). 
 While women appear to have benefited from the ACA’s passage, conversely, men have 
not seen the same spike in insurance. Whether a state expanded its Medicaid program really ef-
fected who had access to healthcare and who did not particularly for men. As of 2014, 15 million 
non-elderly, non-disabled, males were uninsured which accounts for roughly 55% of noninsured 
adults and of this 15 million uninsured males, nearly 6.6 million now qualify for Medicaid insur-
ance under the ACA, although ability to receive coverage largely varies between the states that 
expanded Medicaid and those that did not. Men that live in states that expanded Medicaid qualify 
for assistance if they make within the 138% of the federal poverty line, however, for men who 
live in states that did not expand, regardless of their salary they cannot receive Medicaid ("Char-
acteristics of Remaining Uninsured Men”).  
 A third of the uninsured male population reported that they paid for medical expenses 
without insurance aid in 2014.  These out of pocket expenses has potentially negative effects on 
the groups overall health given that high out of pocket expenses means that this group is less 
likely to receive preventative care or seek out medical care when they are sick. Many factors in-
crease the likelihood that a non-elderly male will be uninsured. In addition to perceived afford-
ability, education and socioeconomic status and motivation may play a key role here. Young sin-
gle fathers may perceive that they do not need health insurance or cannot afford it. Around 11.3 
million of these men are single, childless adults. Significantly, African Americans make up over 
half of the uninsured non-elderly male population ("Characteristics of Remaining Uninsured 
Men”). 
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 Even under the ACA, immigrants without proper documentation do not qualify for gov-
ernment aid through Medicaid, Medicare, or the marketplaces.  For many legal immigrants who 
do qualify, gaining insurance still presents many challenges. As of 2014, an estimated 30% of the 
uninsured population were hispanic which makes hispanics the minority with the highest rate of 
remaining uninsured (“Adults Who Remain Uninsured”). 
 The insurance disparity amongst Hispanics is likely due to a combination of language 
barriers, immigration status, and/or work status. A study conducted by University of Texas De-
partment of Pediatrics showed that adolescents who grew up in a home where English was not 
the primary language spoken, were less likely to have insurance and were less likely to undergo 
preventative care, as well as reported higher dissatisfaction with doctor’s office visit (May.) Try-
ing to acquire medical care or insurance while dealing with a language barrier can present chal-
lenges even for what seems to be straightforward tasks. Sometimes, Non-English speakers can-
not communicate their symptoms in terms the doctors understand which often leads to misdiag-
nosis. Furthermore, if a person does not speak English, it can be difficult to even schedule an ap-
pointment or inquire about insurance coverage. And if they do have insurance, misunderstand-
ings occur over coverage and expenses, given that a person may not be able to read and compre-
hend their insurance plan that is written in English (Rhodes). 
 In addition to the challenges of mere comprehension and ability to obtain insurance, 
many minorities encounter cultural differences that may make patients less likely to visit doctors 
or seek out medical care. When people visit a doctor of a different race, they are more likely to 
report that they felt dissatisfied after their doctor visit especially if they do not understand their 
diagnosis or if they do not understand the type of medical care they are receiving. This occurs 
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between other cultures who often have medical norms that differ from the US. For example in 
Korea, a routine checkup includes a colonoscopy. Korean patients in the US who did not receive 
a colonoscopy, reported poor quality of care and the doctors struggled to communicate why this 
type of screening is not necessary at routine checkups (Rhodes). 
 This anecdote about cultural differences highlights a larger issue for ethnic minority 
groups. Not only did this group report low levels of insurance within the Korean community, 
they also reported high levels dissatisfaction with their healthcare experience (Rhodes). They still 
faced issues of misdiagnosis and inability to surpass language barriers. So while the ACA may 
provide an insurance opportunity for these cultural minorities that they did not have before, hav-
ing insurance options available does not necessarily equate to receiving healthcare treatment or 
being able to utilize the insurance that the ACA makes available whether that be due to issues 
navigating beyond language barriers in the marketplace, a lack of motivation sparked by high 
dissatisfaction or other challenges.  
 While language creates an addition challenge. Not understanding how to access and nav-
igate the online marketplace exchanges and other government aid websites affects who actually 
enrolls in the marketplace. Beginning in the 1990s, a trend emerged where internet usage was 
highest amongst, if not limited to, universities, military and government agencies, wealthy, well 
educated, and mostly males. These trends have decreased in the US due to both the efforts of the 
government and the private sector to bring technology to more people as well as the gradual in-
crease of availability, affordability, and necessity of technology. However these trends of limited 
access have not disappeared entirely. Major barriers to access still exist. Two large trends of lim-
ited access exist based on geography and socioeconomic levels. Inner cities, rural areas, or areas 
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with low income have substantially less physical access to computer and internet access. This is 
partially attributed to the costs of building infrastructure for internet use. Investing in in-
frastructure in rural areas or inner cities would likely not be profitable since even if physical ac-
cess were available, the services would likely still be unaffordable for the typically poor people 
living in these areas (Howard). 
 Government efforts helped increase access in lower socioeconomic areas by providing 
incentives for private sector infrastructure investment as well as actually building infrastructure 
in these areas. These federal and state initiatives provide economic benefits in terms of job 
searches but also in terms of having the ability to access government aid programs (Howard). 
More and more government services are becoming digital, such as social security, Medicaid, 
Medicare, and the ACA federal health insurance exchange. This puts those without internet ac-
cess at a general  disadvantage, Moreover, those with the greatest barriers to internet access are 
often either the elderly or are lower socioeconomic status who are the primary targets for gov-
ernment assistance programs like Medicaid or the federal ACA marketplace exchanges which 
suggests that a lack of internet access affects enrollment in the marketplaces for these disadvan-
taged groups.  
 However, there are some programs in place to help alleviate the lack of access to tech-
nology use. Many community centers and libraries offer free computer usage. Yet even physical 
access to a computer still presents the challenge of proficiently using one. This could be hindered 
by anything from language barriers, low literacy, or age. Many librarians have been trained to 
assist users with basic governmental services. Government agencies such as the Department of 
Social Security even encourages seniors to go to local libraries for assistance with online retire-
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ment. The assistance has many limitations. Many librarians are only able to assist with basic ser-
vices on government websites and have little training on how to use these websites and answer-
ing questions (Bishop). Additionally, assistance varies by location.  For example, assistance is 
more likely available in larger state libraries as opposed to small regional libraries. This makes it 
less likely that a library in a rural area, the areas with higher barriers, would have the resources to 
assist users. Additionally, areas with larger Spanish speaking residents would be more likely to 
have someone who could assist in Spanish than would an area without a larger Spanish speaking 
population.  
 The lack of infrastructure in poorer parts of cities mirrors a larger common urban divide 
amongst socioeconomic groups within cities. In addition to having higher immigrant and minori-
ty populations, cities are also privy to having larger gaps between income levels that abet forma-
tion of gentrified and marginalized areas. These areas are characterized by more risky behaviors, 
particularly associated with higher crime rates coupled with the higher likelihood of having diffi-
culty obtaining basic needs. People in these areas of the cities are also less likely to be insured 
and more likely to utilize emergency services as opposed to preventive and primary care ser-
vices. In stark contrast, the wealthier areas are characterized by good health, less risky behaviors, 
higher rates of insurance, and higher access to preventative services (Urban versus Rural 
Health). 
 Despite socioeconomic disparities in cities, rural areas appear to face greater barriers to 
physical access and have lower overall health. In cities, doctors and other health services are 
more readily available as opposed to rural counties where patients must travel greater distances 
to obtain basic services and preventative care. This contributes to an increased likelihood of 
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emergency service use. In addition to a lack of physical access to doctors and services, the life-
style in rural areas is substantially more risky, including higher rates of tobacco and excessive 
alcohol use, decreased likelihood to wear a seatbelt and increased likelihood to be obese (Urban 
Versus Rural Health).  
 Education levels also correlate with a person’s overall health and access to care. Firstly, 
those who attend college are more likely to have stable employment with higher pay and more 
healthcare benefits. Higher paying jobs also leaves more discretionary income available for pur-
chasing insurance and receiving nonessential medical services such as preventative care screen-
ings, teeth cleanings, flu shots (Fletcher). 
  Second, evidence found by the National Library of Medicine suggests that people with 
more schooling may actually comprehend medical advice better and be able adjust their lifestyles 
accordingly more so than those with less schooling. Given that there exists a saturated supply of 
medical information readily available online, barriers to accessing general health advice have 
been minimized while the ability to actually understand and implement recommended medical 
care and warning signs may be more challenging.  This is further reflected in the correlation be-
tween less risky behaviors more commonly exhibited amongst higher educated versus the more 
risky behaviors that are more commonly exhibited amongst lower education levels. Receiving an 
additional four years of schooling beyond high school substantially lowers mortality rates, obesi-
ty rates, heart disease rates, and the chances of developing several other health conditions. In ad-
dition to lowering the overall chance of developing these conditions, education levels may affect 
the severity that the condition. Since those with higher education levels are more likely to utilize 
preventative screenings, the conditions are more likely to be caught early on versus those with 
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lower education levels who are more likely to utilize emergency medical services once the condi-
tion progresses (Fletcher). 
 Another aspect the marketplaces focused on was increasing the average person’s ability 
to comprehend the amount of available information so that people could enroll into a more cus-
tomized and understandable plan. Government agencies switching to online services, ideally 
would make anything from filing taxes to receiving Medicaid benefits more efficient and less 
burdensome to the user. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
Act of 2009 gave funding to hospitals and doctor offices so they could digitize their medical files 
thus allowing patients to access their records online. With more information online, patients 
would be able to receive more information on their conditions as well as have guidelines for 
treatment (Lyles). This would be most helpful for minorities or lower socioeconomic classes that 
were more likely to have chronic conditions needing long term self-care. Having health informa-
tion online also presented the potential to mitigate language barriers that doctors encounter when 
trying to communicate specific medical terminology and treatment steps to someone of another 
language. Websites, though likely limited to major languages, often have the option to view con-
tent in another language. Additionally, audio versions sometimes are available for people with 
low literacy rates (Lyles). However, it is important to note that, not all minority groups face the 
same barriers.  Spanish speakers are more likely to find someone that speaks Spanish or  pro-
grams seeking to mobilize and enroll other Spanish speakers compared to a smaller minority 
population such as North Koreans living in the United States.   
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Section 5. Hypotheses  
 Given these challenges discussed throughout the section above, I would expect to see the 
following relationships between certain demographic factors and actual enrollment in the mar-
ketplace: 
 1. Due to a combination of lower rates of employment, lower income, and fewer afford-
able insurance options, lower socioeconomic classes had more barriers to healthcare and insur-
ance access prior to the ACA, therefore the marketplace should see higher enrollment for this 
group. However the lower socioeconomic status were not the only economic group facing insur-
ance access problems prior to the ACA. Though less common, even those in the upper socioeco-
nomic classes did not always have affordable insurance options whether this be due to a lack of 
insurance offered through an employer or other factors. Therefore enrollment should increase for 
all groups besides just those in the lower socioeconomic status. I expect to see more actual en-
rollment in PUMAs that have more people within the lower 25th percentile of income than in 
PUMAs with fewer people within the lower 25th percentile. I expect to see more overall enroll-
ment in PUMAs with more people in the upper 75th percentile than in PUMAs with fewer peo-
ple in the 75th percentile.  
 2.   The ACA expanded coverage to millions of women who had previously not had vi-
able employer based insurance options or could not afford the insurance available to them.  Addi-
tionally, men generally seem to take less advantage of and seem to place less value on healthcare, 
compared to women who generally have higher healthcare costs and needs. Therefore I expect to 
find that PUMAs with higher percentages of men will see lower actual enrollment than in 
PUMAs with lower percentages of men.   
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 3.  I expect to find that language plays a role in determining actual enrollment given that 
speakers of other languages face additional challenges to overcome to enroll. I expect to find that 
PUMAs with more Spanish speakers will have higher rates of actual enrollment than in PUMAs 
with fewer Spanish speakers. PUMAs with more English speakers should see more actual en-
rollment then in PUMAs with fewer English speakers and PUMAs with more other language 
speakers should see more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer other language speakers.  
 4.  Whites had higher rates of insurance rates prior to the ACA than did minority groups 
which is likely attributed to higher employment, education, and incomes amongst whites and the 
lower employment, education, and income levels associated with certain minorities.  Whites also 
faced fewer cultural barriers and showed more trust of doctors than other minority groups did. 
Therefore I assert that whites who were uninsured prior to the ACA were more likely to be unin-
sured for reasons other than a lack of access to insurance coverage. I expect to see that PUMAs 
with more whites will show lower rates of actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer whites.  
I expect to see PUMAs with more Hispanics will see more enrollment than in PUMAs with few-
er Hispanics. I expect to see PUMAs with more people of other ethnicities will see more actual 
enrollment than PUMAs with fewer people of other ethnicities. I expect to see more actual en-
rollment in PUMAs with more African Americans than in PUMAs with fewer African Ameri-
cans. 
 5. I would expect to see higher rates of actual enrollment in PUMAs with higher percent-
age urban than in PUMAs with lower percentage urban. More urban areas are more likely to 
have higher minority populations and more people in the lower socioeconomic status, which 
means urban areas have a higher concentration of populations who were at a higher risk to be 
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without insurance coverage options prior to the ACA compared to the suburbs who would gener-
ally have higher incomes and less minorities. Additionally, cities have more doctors and health-
care infrastructure and more outreach programs and resources for enrollment aid than the less 
rural areas. Lastly more urban areas should have more internet infrastructure than less urban ar-
eas. The marketplaces are largely ran online so a lack of adequate internet access, which I will 
measure in terms of maximum upload speeds, should make enrollment more difficult. Therefore 
I expect to see that PUMAs with higher maximum upload speeds should see more actual enroll-
ment than in PUMAs with lower maximum upload speeds.  
 6.  Education is correlated to income level. This usually entailed that jobs with higher pay 
would provide employer based insurance. People in these higher paying jobs would be more 
likely to have insurance prior to the passage of the ACA and therefore are not included in our 
data. However people in jobs with lower pay who were likely uninsured due to a lack of employ-
er based insurance options. The marketplace would give groups greater access therefore I would 
expect to see higher rates of enrollment in PUMAs with more people with a high school diploma 
than in PUMAs with fewer people with a high school diploma. I would expect to see that the 
PUMAs with more people with some years of college would see higher enrollment than in 
PUMAs with fewer people with some years of college.  
 7. Age has a lot of associated factors that would affect enrollment likelihood. Anyone 65 
or older would qualify for Medicare therefore, in the enrollment data, I will only look at people 
under 65 who are in the non-elderly age group. Additionally, anyone up to age 26 who does not 
have their own employer based insurance is allowed the option to stay on their parent’s insurance 
therefore these people would be excluded also from the analysis.  However, people in this age 
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group of 18 to 25 are permitted to choose to still enroll in the marketplace if their family situa-
tion does not permit them to receive this aid from a parent’s plan, so the data does account for 
those people within this group who were not receiving parental coverage. 
  Though some people in the lower 25th percentile age group place great value on having 
health insurance, the group as a whole is less likely to value health insurance as a necessity since 
the group is generally healthier and therefore usually expect fewer medical costs compared to the 
middle and upper age groups who generally have more medical expenses and health issues.  
therefore, I expect to see more enrollment in PUMAs with more people in the lower 25th than in 
PUMAs with fewer people in the lower 25th age percentile. I would expect to see higher actual 
enrollment in PUMAs with more people in the middle age percentile than in PUMAs with fewer 
people in the middle age percentile. I would expect to see more actual enrollment in PUMAs 
with more people in the upper 75th age percentile than in PUMAs with fewer people in the upper 
75th age percentile.  
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Section 6. Research Design 
 In order to determine if a particular demographic group saw more actual enrollment in the 
marketplaces, I compared the amount of people who were estimated to be eligible for market-
place enrollment to the number of people who actually enrolled.  To conduct my research I ob-
tained data from the Kaiser Family Foundation on enrollment statistics, from the US Census bu-
reau on urban verse rural composition and from the Federal Communications Commission on 
internet speeds. 
 I used data collected by the Kaiser Foundation where they estimated who they believed 
would be eligible to enroll in the marketplace. They analyzed Public Use Microdata Areas 
(PUMAs) which are statical geographic groupings produced by the US Census Bureau. The bu-
reau defines PUMAs as units that contain at least 100,000 people and are produced for every 
state. Each PUMA is created based on county lines or other census tracts and does not cross over 
state lines (US Census Bureau).  
 From the census data, Kaiser excluded people from their potential enrollment pool calcu-
lations who had insurance offered by their employer but included people who had insurance from 
their employer that did not meet the ACA’s adequately and affordability standards making these 
individuals eligible for premium tax credits. The potential enrollment calculations looked at peo-
ple without coverage, primarily, but also looked into people with non-group coverage and certain 
individuals with non-spousal dependents who may qualify for premium tax credits. Kaiser then 
removed people with incomes that qualify for Medicaid and CHIP benefits and removed people 
who were noncitizen. Lastly, Kaiser excluded people who could receive certain types of employ-
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ee security insurance (ESI) benefits which are benefits paid to dependents of a person who was 
killed in a work related accident (Kaiser, “Methodology”). 
 In order to analyze the relationship between internet access and enrollment, I merged in 
data from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as well as data on the percentage of 
urban and rural demographic makeup of PUMAs provided by the Missouri Census Data Center 
(Missouri State Census Data Center). The FCC report tracks download and upload speeds, tech-
nology and geographic changes overtime. The report defines upload speed as “the speed of 
transmission from the end user to the internet.” Prior to 2014, internet providers reported data in 
terms of “speed tiers” such as high middle and low but now the providers report based on the ac-
tual highest and lowest upload and download speeds measured in Megabits per second (Mbps). 
For my analysis I looked at maximum upload speed which is defined by the FCC as the maxi-
mum advertised upload speed within that census block which they broke down into four upload 
speed categories: less than 1 Mbps, 1 to 2.9 Mbps, 3 to 5.9 Mbps, and 6 Mbps and faster. It is 
important to note that while the FCC looks at maximum speeds offered within census tracts. this 
does not necessarily reflect the speed offered to every home within that census block nor does it 
include the amount of competition of availability of different providers in that census block 
(Federal Communications Commission). 
 Once I had collected the data from Kaiser, the FCC, and the census bureau, I merged the 
data sets into STATA and ran several analyses. First I looked at summary statistics which gave 
the mean of each independent variable across all PUMAs and gave the range of the minimum 
and maximum distributions of each variable within a PUMA. Next I ran a correlation test to see 
the correlation strength and associated p-scores between the dependent share variable and each 
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of the independent variables. I also ran regression analyses to create more certainty that the find-
ings represented a true relationship. Lastly, to get a better understanding of how much each 
group accounted for overall enrollment share, I ran an analysis of the expected values. The re-
sults are discussed in the following section.  
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Section 7. Findings  
 The “share” variable was the percentage of eligible potential enrollees who actually en-
rolled in the marketplace during the 2014 year. I ran summary statistics, correlations, regression 
analyses and expected value tests to look for trends between the share of actual enrollment with 
race, primary language spoken, gender, non elderly age groups, household income tiers, educa-
tion levels, fastest upload internet speed and urban composition of a PUMA. 
    Table 1- Summary Statistics  
  
 The first variable I looked at was racal ethnicity where I expected to see lower rates of 
actual enrollment in PUMAs with more whites than in PUMAs with fewer whites. I expected to 
find that PUMAs with more African Americans, hispanics, and other ethnicities will show higher 
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rates of actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer African Americans, Hispanics, and other 
ethnicities.    
 Upon analysis, PUMAs showed great variance in ethnic composition. Table 1 column 2 
shows the mean percentage of whites in any given PUMA was 65% but columns 4 and 5 show 
the percentage varied greatly from 1% to 97% white in a given PUMA. Table 1 column 6 shows 
the correlation between share and  percentage white. The correlation shows that PUMAs with 
more white residents showed lower actual enrollment than PUMAs with fewer whites residents. 
Given that whites had higher rates of insurance and fewer barriers to access prior to the estab-
lishment of marketplaces, it is likely that other factors than their race account for the remaining 
population of uninsured whites.  
 Table 1 column 2 shows the mean percentage of Hispanic population within PUMAs was 
15% yet columns 4 and 5 show that the percentage of Hispanics ranged from comprising zero 
percent of a PUMA to comprising 97%. PUMAs with more Hispanic residents saw more actual 
marketplace enrollment than PUMAs with fewer hispanics which holds true with my predictions.  
 Table 1 column 2 shows the mean percentage of African Americans within any given 
PUMA was 14% but columns 4 and 5 showed the percentage ranged from as low as 0% to 96%. 
The correlation shown in column 6 was positive therefore PUMAs with more African Americas 
saw more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer African Americans.  
 Table 1 column 2 shows that the mean percentage of ethnicities other than white, hispanic 
and black accounted for 6% of any given PUMA but columns 4 and 5 show that the percentage 
ranged from 0% to 73% within a given PUMA. Column 6 shows that there was a positive corre-
lation meaning that PUMAs with more ethnicities other than African Americans, white and His-
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panic residents saw more actual marketplace enrollment than PUMAs with fewer other ethnici-
ties. However, column 8 shows that this finding was not statically significant with a p-score of 
0.25. Therefore, we are not able to draw conclusions from this data about the other ethnicity sub-
group. 
 Though the ethnicity variable should highly correlate to the primary language variable, I 
looked at the relationship between share and a person’s language. I expect to see higher rates of 
actual enrollment in PUMAs with more Spanish speakers than in PUMAs with fewer Spanish 
speakers. In PUMAs that have more speakers of a language other than Spanish or English, I ex-
pect to find more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer other language speakers.. 
  The analysis showed that the percentage of primary language spoken within a PUMA 
varied largely. English was the primary language spoken on average by 75% of people within 
PUMAs yet ranged from 3% to 100% of a PUMA,  PUMAs with more English speakers saw 
lower rates of actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer English speakers. Spanish was the 
primary language spoken by an average of 14% but ranged from 0% to 97% within a given 
PUMA. PUMAs with more Spanish speakers saw more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with 
fewer Spanish speakers. Other languages were spoken on average by 7% of any PUMA but 
ranged from 0% to 65% within a PUMA. PUMAs with more other language speakers saw more 
actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer other language speakers.  
 Next when looking at the relationship between share and household income, I expected to 
find higher rates of actual enrollment in PUMAs with more lower income households than in 
PUMAs fewer households. For PUMAs with more upper 75th income households, I expect to 
find lower rates of actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer higher income households. The 
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top and bottom household income varied greatly across PUMAs. The average income for bottom 
25th household income across PUMAs was $33,700 yet ranged from $10,500 to $97,000.Table 1 
column 6 showed a positive correlation therefore, PUMAs with more households with incomes 
within the bottom 25th percentile saw more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer house-
holds with incomes in the bottom 25th percentile. The average income for middle household in-
come within PUMAs was $60,900 yet ranged from $25,000 to $169,000.  There was also a posi-
tive correlation between share and middle household income, therefore PUMAs with more 
households with incomes within the 50th percentile saw more actual enrollment than in PUMAs 
with fewer households with incomes in the 50th percentile. The average top 75th household in-
come across PUMAs was $99,600 yet ranged from $45,000 to $281,000. Lastly, column 6 also 
shows a positive correlation between share and upper 75th income households meaning that 
PUMAs with more households with income within the top 75th percentile saw more actual en-
rollment than in PUMAs with fewer households with incomes in the top 75th percentile. 
 Additionally, I originally predicted that there would be lower levels of actual enrollment 
in PUMAs with more households within the upper 75th percentile than in PUMAs with fewer 
households in the upper 75th percentile given that households with higher incomes would be 
more likely to be able to afford insurance prior to the establishment of marketplaces but the data 
showed that more enrollment occurred when there were more households in a PUMA within the 
upper 75th than fewer households in the upper 75th.  In my original predictions, I failed to con-
sider that though this group had higher incomes, they may still not have had viable employer in-
surance offered or were within the group who was buying non-group insurance which is general-
ly more expensive that the marketplace exchanges. Therefore, the marketplace could offer more 
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affordable options to this group which could account for the higher enrollment in PUMAs with 
more upper 75th incomes than in PUMAs with fewer upper 75th households.    
 Additionally, I assumed the upper income households that did not have insurance prior to 
the establishment of the marketplace would be driven by some other factor than income.  This 
still may be the case given that the ACA mandated that everyone must have insurance or face a 
tax penalty,  The tax penalty may be a factor that motivated people in this group to purchase in-
surance that previously had chosen not to not purchase non-group insurance.  
 The next variable I looked at was the effect of level of education on share of enrollment. I 
expected that PUMAs with more people who had attended some years of college will have high-
er rates of actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer people with at least some years of col-
lege.  On average, 87% of people within a PUMA had a high school degree or more. This ranged 
from 46% to 99% of people within a given PUMA.  On average 28% of people had attended 
years of college. This ranged from 3% to 80% of people within a given PUMA. PUMAs with 
more high school degree earners saw more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer high 
school degree earned. PUMAs with more people who had attended some years of college saw 
more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer people who had attended some years of col-
lege.  
 Next I looked at the effects of internet upload speed and urban population. Considering 
urban areas generally have faster internet and overall greater access to the internet than rural ar-
eas do, I expected to find a high correlation between upload speed and percent urban. I expected 
to see that PUMAs with lower upload speeds will have lower rates of actual enrollment than in 
PUMAs with higher upload speeds.  I also expected to see that in PUMAs with higher percent-
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age urban will see higher rates of actual enrollment than in PUMAs with lower percentages ur-
ban.  This proved true.  The percentage of urbanization within a PUMA averaged 78% yet ranged 
from 11% to 100%. The maximum upload speed averaged 4.8 Mbps across PUMAs yet ranged 
from 2.1 Mbps to 10.5 Mbps in a given PUMA. For PUMAs with higher percentage urban, saw 
more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with lower percentage urban. PUMAs with higher max-
imum upload speeds, saw more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with lower maximum upload 
speeds. PUMAs with higher rates of percent urban saw higher rates of actual enrollment than in 
PUMAs with lower rates of percent urban. 
 The next variable I looked at was gender. The ACA expanded coverage to millions of 
women who had previously fallen into the gap group. Additionally men generally seem to take 
less advantage of and seem to place less value on healthcare than women do. Therefore I expect 
to find that PUMAs with higher percentages of men will see lower actual enrollment than in 
PUMAs with lower percentages of men. The mean for percentage male is 49% and has little 
variation from the mean with a minimum of 43% and maximum of 59% within a given PUMA.  
The tests showed that PUMAs with higher percentages of males saw less actual enrollment than 
in PUMAs with lower percentages of males. 
 The last variable I looked at was age. Given that younger people generally tend to be 
healthier and often perceive less need for insurance. I expect to find that PUMAs with more peo-
ple in the upper 75th percentile of non-elderly aged people will see more actual enrollment than 
in PUMAs with fewer people in the upper 75th percentile of non-elderly aged people. I expect to 
find that PUMAs with more people in the lower 25th percentile of non-elderly aged people will 
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see more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with fewer people in the lower 25th percentile of 
non-elderly aged people. 
 I found that age distribution tended to stay relatively constant across PUMAs. The lower 
25th percentile of non-elderly aged averaged 16% of any PUMA but ranged from making up 8% 
to 26% of a PUMA. The middle 50th percentile of non elderly aged accounted for 31% of any 
PUMA and ranged from 21% to 43% of a PUMA. The upper 75th percentile accounted for an 
average of 47% and ranged from 29% to 59% of a given PUMA.  
 PUMAs with higher percentages of the lower 25th percentile of non elderly aged people 
saw more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with lower percentages of the lower 25th percentile 
of non elderly aged people. PUMAs with higher percentages of the middle 50th percentile of non 
elderly aged people saw more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with lower percentages of the 
middle 50th percentile of non elderly aged people. PUMAs with higher percentages of the upper 
75th percentile of non elderly aged people saw more actual enrollment than in PUMAs with low-
er percentages of the upper 75th percentile of non elderly aged people. 
Table 2 Regression Analysis  
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 I next ran regression analysis to see if the effects of each variable held true when weighed 
against the effects of other variables. I choose to look at a variable from each of the major cate-
gory but for reasons of collinearity, I had to run separate regressions for the race variables be-
cause there was overlap between the black and white variables with the percentage urban vari-
able as well as overlap between the Spanish language variable with the hispanic ethnicity vari-
able. I choose to look at the middle percentile variable for both age and income instead of look-
ing at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles. Lastly, I chose to run years of college instead of the 
high school variable due to the overlap of the two variables that exists because assuredly every-
one who goes to college holds a high school degree equivalent.  
 The regression analysis results shown in table 2 showed that percent urban, years of col-
lege, Spanish speakers, and middle 50th age percentile all had positive coefficients meaning 
PUMAs with more of each these variables showed more enrollment than PUMAs with less pres-
ence of each. Additionally, the percentage male variable still showed a negative coefficient 
meaning that the more males in PUMA showed less enrollment than PUMAs with fewer makes 
even when controlling for the effects of other variables.  However, row 5 column 2 shows that 
middle 50th income had a negative coefficient in the regression analysis. this differed from our 
findings in the correlations power correlations shown in table 1, row 17, column 6, which said 
there was a positive relationship between enrollment share and middle income households. 
percentile, The regression analysis findings for males, age, college years, Spanish speakers,and 
percent urban were all consistent with the results of the power correlation tests displayed in table 
1, which yields more confidence in our findings.  
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   Table 3 -Expected Values 
   
 Lastly I looked at the expected values associated with the minimum and maximum share 
of each variable, displayed above in Table 3. In the PUMA with the lowest share, the non-elderly 
group had an expected value of 22.1 while in the PUMA with the highest share of non-elderly 
aged people, the expected value was 64.3. Table 3 column 7 shows an extremely large difference 
of 42.2 percent when moving from the lowest to highest share of non-elderly aged group across 
PUMAs.  
 Table 3 row 2 shows the effects of moving from the highest to lowest share of the Span-
ish speakers across PUMAs. Table 3 column 3 shows that Spanish speakers have an expected 
value of 40.4 in the PUMA with the lowest share while column 5 shows that Spanish speakers 
have an expected value of 58.7 in the PUMA with the highest share. Column 7 shows that there 
is an difference of 18.3 percentile when moving form the PUMA with lowest to the PUMA with 
the highest share.  
 Table 3, row 3 shows the expected values of the percent male variable when moving from 
the PUMA with the highest to the PUMA with the lowest share of males. Table 2, row 4, column 
2 showed that there was a negative correlation negative correlation between males and enroll-
ment share, therefore saw a decrease when moving from the lowest share to the highest share. 
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Though table 3 columns 3 and 5 showed little variance between the percent of males within any 
PUMA, only changing from 43% to 59%, column7 showed the expected values had a relatively 
large change with a difference of 21.6%. Column 4 and column 6 showed that the PUMA with 
the most males had an expected value of 51.4 and the PUMA with the fewest males had an ex-
pected value of 29.6. Though other variables had similar or even larger shifts in expected values, 
the other variables saw much larger variance between the highest and lowest percents found in 
any PUMA than did the male variable which deviated little from the mean.  
 Table 3 row 4 shows the expected values of the middle 50th income tier when middle in-
come is at its highest and lowest value within any PUMA. The income variable was rescaled to 
divide actual income in dollars by10,000 dollars in order for this variable to be comparable to the 
scale of the other variables. Column 6 showed that middle income households had an expected 
value of  51.4 in the PUMA with the most middle income households and column 4 showed an 
expected value of 27.6 in the PUMA with the fewest middle income households. The difference 
in expected values was 25.8. There was a decrease when moving from the lowest to the PUMA 
with the highest percentage of income because there was a negative correlation associated with 
middle income and share as shown in table 2, row 5, column 2.  
 The expected value of having some years of college was 38.5 in the PUMA with the low-
est distribution of people with years of college and had an expected value of 52.8 in the PUMA 
with the highest distribution of people with years of college. The expected value of the years of 
college variable only differed 14.3% when moving from the PUMA with the highest to lowest 
distribution.  
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 The expected value of percent urban was 38 in the PUMA with the lowest distribution  
and 44.7 in the PUMA with the highest distribution.  This was a modest difference of 11.7% 
when moving form the highest to lowest values.  
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      Section 8.  Limitations  
 Overall, my analysis shows that the Affordable Care Act appears to have helped many 
groups obtain access to health insurance that have historically faced more barriers to obtaining 
insurance.  While the Affordable Care Act more specifically aimed to provide insurance coverage 
to everyone, it also had the underlying intent of bringing about healthcare services like preven-
tive care treatments that would lead to a healthier and better cared for population. It is important 
to note that my thesis looks simply at enrollment rates and is not able to make these broader con-
clusions about insurance access automatically equating to actually utilizing healthcare resources 
or creating a healthier population.   
  While minority groups may have insurance access provided through the marketplaces, 
minority groups may still face cultural or linguistic challenges that hinder these groups from ac-
tually utilizing or wanting to utilize services. Additionally having insurance does not guarantee 
adequate availability to healthcare facilities where a person lives nor does it guarantee access to 
healthcare facilities that accepts their insurance. In order to gain a more thorough understating of 
the impact that the Affordable Care Act had on the general health of these groups, further studies 
could look at healthcare services utilization rates as well as the overall health and disease rates 
typically associated with minority groups. 
 Additionally, my data only looked at enrollment trends for the year of 2014, which is the 
year that the individual mandate began penalizing people who did not have insurance. Further 
analysis could look at enrollment trends in these groups over a larger time period to better deter-
mine if the Affordable Care Act provided a lasting, positive impact on the populations who were 
historically more likely to be uninsured. A longer temporal study could account for effects that 
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the individual mandate’s tax penalty may cause. Also, my data did not look at people residing 
inside the US illegally which entails that our analysis may fail to accurately represent access to 
healthcare and insurance for the Hispanic population in the U.S. I was not able to draw statically 
significant conclusions about enrollment trends for speakers of another language other than Eng-
lish or Spanish with the available data. Lastly, the marketplace enrollment data only looked at 
states that had not established their own state based marketplace exchange as of 2014. 
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    9. Discussion and Conclusions 
 Before the passage of the ACA, about 16% of the country was without insurance and as 
of the beginning of 2016 that number was nearly cut in half with roughly 8.5% of US citizens 
remaining uninsured. Through marketplace enrollment, expansion of Medicaid and extension of 
parental coverage to age 26, nearly 20 million Americans have gained insurance (“ObamaCare 
Enrollment Numbers”). 
 The research conducted for this thesis broke down those enrollment numbers to see what 
groups have benefited and what groups still faced barriers to accessing health insurance. By 
looking at who was eligible to enroll and who actually enrolled in the marketplace, the results 
shows that the Affordable Care Act appears to have been successful in moving the United States 
a step closer to universal coverage. I found increased enrollment amongst women, African Amer-
icans, Hispanics and other ethnicities as well as increased enrollment across all ages, different 
education levels, and income levels and even across language barriers and urban city setting.   
 However not all groups had enrollment increases. Whether due to a dislike of the ACA,  a 
low prioritization on having health insurance or other factors, males and whites were the only 
groups who showed consistent negative enrollment rates. Middle income households showed 
negative enrollment rates under certain tests as well. These results are not too shocking consider-
ing that males, whites and the middle class are generally perceived as having more opportunities 
and privileges and are not generally the primary targets of social programs.  
 Despite the overall increase in insurance for the 20 million Americans that are benefiting 
from the ACA, the legislation has continued to be debated and will likely undergo major repeals 
in the following years under the Trump presidency. The ACA has continued to be a hot button 
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issue throughout the Trump-Clinton presidential debate season leaving a divide between Democ-
rats who generally champion the bill and Republicans that generally view the bill as a massive 
policy failure. Whether for better or worse, the impact on the ACA has had on country’s is unde-
niable. 
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